La coup-curacha

A storm is gathering as some disgruntled officers of the Philippine military are about to attempt to seize the government in the event of a constitutional crisis in the aftermath of the Corona impeachment trial. That’s according to some media reports. What are the chances of a military takeover? Improbable as an American coup d’état.

A contingent of Philippine marines marching at their navy headquarters in Manila.
Agence France-Presse file photo.

There are at least nine “assaults” on the modern Philippine presidency since the ouster of Ferdinand Marcos in 1986, including the puerile 1986 Manila Hotel siege where Arturo Tolentino, Marcos’s running-mate in the February snap election that led to his ouster by EDSA I people power revolution, was sworn as acting president by no less than former Supreme Court Justice Serafin Cuevas, the current head counsel of Renato Corona’s defence team. But that event quietly fizzled out as the Aquino presidency was reinforced by the loyalty of General Fidel Ramos, then Armed Forces chief, and the support of the United States.

RAM Movement

The other attempts were all undertaken by the military to directly take control of the government under Cory Aquino in 1987 and 1989, and against President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in 2003 and 2006. For the first time in Philippine history, these putsches were instigated by reformist military officers organized under the umbrella of Reform the Armed Forces (RAM) Movement led by Col. Gregorio “Gringo” Honasan during the Aquino period and by the Magdalo faction during Arroyo’s term. Col. Honasan’s RAM helped install Mrs. Aquino as president in the bloodless revolution in 1986 but became disgruntled by the way she ran the country.

Two of the six failed coup attempts in 1987 and 1989 were aimed in unseating President Cory Aquino. Col. Honasan, the leader of these coups went into hiding in 1989 after being charged with rebellion for leading the most serious coup against the government. The official casualty list included 99 people dead, including 50 civilians, and 750 wounded. Under orders from President George H.W. Bush, the United States military supported the Aquino government in allowing the use of U.S. airpower from the USS Midway and USS Enterprise aircraft carriers and F-5 fighters from Clark Air Base in the Philippines in shooting down the military rebels if necessary.

Col. Honasan eventually came out from hiding in 1992 after accepting amnesty from General Fidel Ramos, who succeeded Cory Aquino for the presidency. Honasan entered politics and was elected senator in 1995, and now joins his colleagues in the Senate as jurors in the impeachment trial of Chief Justice Corona.

Former coup leaders Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan (left) and Antonio Trillanes IV
(2nd from right) with fellow Philippine senators Tito Sotto and Ferdinand Marcos
Jr. Photo courtesy of No Drugs. Click link to view video on "Gregorio Honasan,"
  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uPXRKYC6EnY

Another leader of the 1986 EDSA I People Power Revolution, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, the defence chief during that time and now President of the Senate, was also arrested for his involvement in the 1989 coup led by Col. Honasan, Enrile’s former military aide. Prior to the coup, Enrile was Cory Aquino’s defence secretary, but he resigned after becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the Aquino government. Enrile was among seven people indicted for “rebellion with murder” in connection with the bloody 1989 coup attempt, charges which were eventually thrown out by the Supreme Court.

Although President Joseph Estrada was ousted from the presidency in 2001 in a bloodless coup, the military did not take a direct role but simply withdrew its allegiance to the unpopular president and threw its support to the EDSA II People Power that forced Estrada to step down. This was reminiscent of Juan Ponce Enrile’s deserting Ferdinand Marcos during EDSA I as the latter’s defence chief when he joined the reformist military officers and the throng of people that drove Marcos out of the country. Former President Fidel Ramos, a former general himself and other high-ranking officers of the military were rumored to have played a direct hand in the military’s reneging their allegiance to President Estrada.

Oakwood mutiny

During her term as president, Gloria Arroyo was besieged by two military coups. The first was in 2003 when a group of soldiers and their officers code-named Magdalo staged a military rebellion popularly known as the Oakwood mutiny. Oakwood was a luxury apartment complex in Makati City and was booby-trapped and seized for 20 hours by 300 rebel soldiers demanding the resignation of Arroyo and the institution of badly-needed reforms in the military.

Oakwood mutineers, 2003. Photo courtesy of Mr. Hepe .

The Oakwood mutiny lasted for 20 hours and ended in the surrender of the rebel soldiers under a deal that would release the soldiers and only imprison the so-called ringleaders, the junior officers. This mutiny was unlike the previous coups staged by the military. It consisted of a new generation of military radicals different from the old RAM under Honasan which by now had become a political group known as Rebolusyonaryong Alyansang Makabansa (Revolutionary Nationalist Alliance).

Magdalo was headed by Philippine Military Academy (PMA) graduates from the Class 1990s and beyond and most of the mutiny leaders were honour cadets in their class. Army Capt. Gerardo Gambala, who was the main leader of the mutiny, was the valedictorian of PMA Class 1995. Navy Lt. Antonio Trillanes, a young naval officer, was a very articulate spokesman of Magdalo at that time. Most of the Magdalo leaders were not only prominent in their class but belonged to poor families who managed to send them to the military academy because of government scholarships. The Magdalo group was further rumored to have initiated secret negotiations with the leftist elements, notably the CPP-NPA, in forming an alliance to seize the government.

Two more aborted coups against the Arroyo administration in February 2006 failed to gather support from top military brass and from the people as the anniversary of EDSA I was celebrated. Some have dubbed the failed coup as a “walk-in-the-park” tactic hoping the military rebels would be able to generate people power support.

Trillanes, who was one of the leaders of the Oakwood tyranny, ran for senator and won while in prison. As Ramos did for Honasan, Noynoy Aquino, three months in his presidency, granted amnesty to Trillanes along with 300 other mutineers in an attempt to expand his influence in the Senate. Senator Trillanes is now serving his term as senator and is considered an ally of Noynoy Aquino, especially in the impeachment of Chief Justice Corona.

Military not trained to rule

The leaders of all the failed military putsches against the Philippine government were all trained by the PMA, a military training school modeled after the United States Military Academy with officers from the Philippine Scouts and regular United States Army as instructors and members of the general staff. It was no wonder that officers produced by the PMA were similarly imbued with the tradition of professionalism of American soldiers. Many American observers are unanimous in their opinion that an American coup d’état is next to impossible because of the culture of the military. Civilian control of the military is too deeply ingrained in the armed forces. Therefore, the notion of a cabal of U.S. military officers colluding to overthrow the government is almost unthinkable. The professional ethic within the military is firmly committed to the principle that they don't rule.

Philippine Military Academy cadets in Pass in Review Ceremony. Photo courtesy
of TrafikMedia. Click link to view "Should the military intervene in politics?"
 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L-gPShrgPYw

In addition to their training like American military officers, the Philippine military does not have a revolutionary nationalist heritage. It was organized as a direct result of American colonization and used as an auxiliary force to support U.S. occupation troops. Since the granting of Philippine independence in 1946, the Armed Forces of the Philippines has maintained very close links to the U.S. military through assistance and training programs, and heavy military aid from the U.S. government in exchange for the current Balikatan exercises between the two countries on Philippine soil and waters.

The right-wing media which spread the absurd theory that the Left had made an alliance with the Magdalo group of military rebels during the aborted Oakwood mutiny in 2003 have resurrected this old yarn that the same alliance is plotting a coup against the Aquino government. Some military officers are blaming some “leftist personalities” in the Aquino administration who are planning to grab power as part of the communist infiltration of the government.

It was Senator Antonio Trillanes, a leader of the Oakwood mutiny, who made the exposé of a coup plot against President Aquino.

On his part, President Aquino said some groups were planning to oust him because of his fight against graft and corruption from the “old system,” alluding to retired military officers close to former President Gloria Arroyo who is currently in prison for election fraud and corruption.

Jose Ma. Sison, alleged founder and leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines, is also reported to have slipped into the country and is reported to be discussing the formation of a coalition government with Noynoy Aquino.

Idle chatter part of destabilization

 

All this idle chatter about a military coup against President Aquino sounds more like part of a destabilization campaign by the government and the military. As with all the previous attempts in the past, a new putsch will certainly fail. Noynoy Aquino will reward the top brass of the military for their efforts in quelling another mutiny, in exchange for their undivided loyalty. Perhaps some junior officers will capitalize on this incident and emulate the feats of Honasan and Trillanes in joining Congress.

Even if the acquittal of Chief Justice Corona could trigger a constitutional crisis, it is still not enough to stir a military takeover. What should really worry President Noynoy Aquino is the great possibility of a huge transport strike and massive demonstrations against the crippling cost of diesel fuel, similar to the late 1960s that led to the proclamation of martial law. Should Noynoy’s advisers bungle this situation, as they are wont to do, it could spark widespread unrest.

President Noynoy Aquino should not fear an alliance between the Left and the military rebels, an impossible phenomenon to occur in the Philippines, although it’s been the norm in other countries. All the Aquino administration should worry is that his government will fall from its weight, for its failure to improve the lives of the poor, and for doing nothing.

EDSA I is not a revolution

We Filipinos love romance. We always love a story that ends well. That’s what EDSA I is to many of us, a revolution without bloodletting, and the ultimate triumph of spirit over evil in its most romantic sense.

We shudder at the thought of more than a million people gathered on one long street demanding the end to a despotic regime, and when we recall how they achieved their purpose without resistance from the government’s army, we shudder even more.

Twenty-six years have passed, yet we have not recovered from the euphoria of EDSA I. Every year we celebrate its anniversary, even much bigger than our Independence Day parade. To many Filipinos, EDSA I was the real thing.

Filipino People Power. Photo courtesy of manilamommy. Click link to view
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YL0lM3abUQE&feature=fvst, "26th EDSA
People Power Anniversary Rally."

Never again, we tell ourselves, shall we allow one dictator to rule over us. As if this were the magic bullet that we need every time we face a crisis. Just gather about 2 million people and get them to march on the street. Let their voices be heard, that would be enough. That’s the miracle of EDSA I.

Why did we become so enslaved to this romantic notion that EDSA I and all its derivatives of display of people power would be enough, that it is the end-all to our problems?

Was EDSA I a revolution?

EDSA I was a popular protest of close too to 2 million Filipinos against authoritarianism, against almost 20 years of despotic rule, of wanton corruption, of abuse of power, of crony capitalism. Although the protest was staged only in Manila, it was considered a collective entreaty by the nation to the dictator to step down and let a new government take over. A new president was elected, and the people vowed not to tolerate any more cheating and fraud. It was a united plea for change. But even that idea of change was so vague and nebulous.

EDSA I represented a cleansing of the heavy cheating and fraud during the presidential elections held in 1986. It was the penultimate event to the declaration of the genuine winner, Mrs. Cory Aquino, who was catapulted to the role of a reluctant national leader after her husband Ninoy was assassinated. Cory Aquino was immediately embraced as the symbolic leader of a peaceful transition to genuine democratic reforms. But even the idea of democratic reform was alien to Cory Aquino’s state of mind, so she left everything to her advisers to chart the map towards building a new government that is supposed to be responsive to the people.

EDSA I meant the restoration of the old oligarchy that was removed and transplanted by Ferdinand Marcos with his own political cronies. It meant that Cory Aquino’s family would recover their old economic foothold, in the same way as it did for the oligarchs of the past.

EDSA I changed the leadership structure of government, but not the structure of society. The poor remain stuck in the quagmire of poverty. The new leaders and the new politicians are all members of family dynasties bred by the oligarchs. It was a replication of the old Marcos government, except that the people who ran the government are now allies of the restored oligarchy. Where did the poor and downtrodden masses figure in the new government after EDSA I? They became significant only during elections, when it was time to buy their votes. Their disenchantment toward their government continues to the present.

EDSA I was the culmination of the people’s revolt against 20 years of Marcos dictatorship. It didn’t happen just because Marcos cheated Cory Aquino during the snap presidential elections in 1986. It didn’t happen because the people were angry at Ferdinand Marcos for the assassination of Ninoy Aquino three years earlier. It happened because the timing was right. Marcos was frail and already dying. The disgruntled elements of the military seized that opportunity to rally their members who had long been dissatisfied with the military establishment, the Roman Catholic Church and its multitude of followers, and the disaffected business sector to come out to the streets and join the popular protest. Members of the leftist movement who were the most militant and who bore the brunt of repression of all groups in opposing the Marcos rule during the 20-year period, had no choice but to join the wave of protesters as well. EDSA I happened because the United States government supported the idea of disposing Marcos and replacing him with a new one.

EDSA I elevated the military to a hero’s status. After being sworn to office, instead of prosecuting those in the military for violation of human rights and the basic legal right to express a contrary opinion and for being responsible for the many who were extra-judicially killed and disappeared, Cory Aquino pardoned the perpetrators. No effort was made to establish the truth and seek reconciliation as other countries under similar circumstances had done after their political upheaval was over.

To the media and moderate Filipino intellectuals, EDSA I was a revolution. They were responsible in propagating this myth that people power had effectively spoken and that EDSA I was instrumental in restoring democracy in the Philippines. True, the dictator was deposed and forced to exile in Hawaii. But democratic institutions like popular elections, the free press, Congress and the judiciary were all in existence, albeit subject to the whims and caprices of the strongman Marcos.

Military as shadow government

Nothing very dramatic or revolutionary happened after EDSA I. It simply installed a new leader, someone who did not meet the basic requisites of a national leader but symbolic enough to lead the country from dictatorship. This is the singular achievement of EDSA I, the proclamation of Cory Aquino and the ouster of Ferdinand Marcos, the passing of the baton from a dictator to someone more moderate and compassionate.

Cory Aquino’s lack of political experience was tested early by malcontents in the military. Staging a series of coups against the government, the military kept reminding the new president that they were a crucial and integral force in the new balance of power. So Cory had to assuage a more serious military opposition to her administration. The military had become the shadow government, and the eternal threat to succeeding presidents like Ramos, Estrada, Arroyo and now, Noynoy Aquino, the son who also rises.

Restoring the old oligarchy which Marcos destroyed was also a priority for Mrs. Aquino, who herself hailed from a landed class with a vast array of economic and financial interests that were held back by the old Marcos regime. Together with the old oligarchy, the new power-holders cemented their firm grasp of political power. To those with the economic means and resources goes the concentration of political power. They bred and continue to multiply political dynasties who control different positions in national and local governments. Politicians and their relatives have controlled political power since the time of Marcos, and Cory Aquino made sure this arrangement would remain. An emerging breed of politicians such as movie, TV and sports celebrities was encouraged to relieve the growing discontent of the masses so these favourite celluloid heroes were added into the mix.

Same same

This was the very same oligarchy that the American colonial period ushered in from the landed elites in the 19th century. The development of these families as the new oligarchy was important to the American colonisers, and these families were able to dominate the country’s political and administrative apparatus and shape it to serve their own ends.

So EDSA I ensured the continuation of an oligarchy that would always remain in control of the levers of the economy and the powers of government. What revolution are the media and moderate darlings of the Philippine intelligentsia talking about?

A revolution is always followed by fundamental changes in socio-political institutions after the struggle for state power. A revolution does not have to be violent. It could be extra-constitutional and in the form of a popular but peaceful upheaval like the Dandi Salt March led by the pioneer of nonviolent resistance Mahatma Gandhi in 1930. EDSA I did not alter the socio-political landscape after Marcos was deposed. In fact, EDSA I reinforced the oligarchy and its control of the economy and politics of the country.

If the exercise of people power is to be considered relevant, then we should expect some profound changes after all the public fuss is over. We should wait for something more drastic than a mere change in leaders, like prosperity for all, for example.

With Filipino people power as in the case of EDSA I, you could almost expect everyone to join with or without a cause. To be meaningful, a real mass movement must have an unmistakable expression of resentment and desperation. That’s why the call for a new people power or revival of EDSA I to oust Corona as Chief Justice will easily fall on deaf ears, except for the few who are the clear beneficiaries of such public uproar.

The Filipino masses are in a desperate condition all right, but unfortunately there is no sign that they feel the slightest resentment against the Chief Justice. Probably, they would just sit this one at home and blame the President for his penchant for playing political games.

Eventually, however, change of some sort must be made. Not through another EDSA I or a similar expression of people power. That won’t cut. New forms of structure need to be set up, and old forms must be destroyed. This is the critical moment which is properly called revolution.