EDSA I is not a revolution

We Filipinos love romance. We always love a story that ends well. That’s what EDSA I is to many of us, a revolution without bloodletting, and the ultimate triumph of spirit over evil in its most romantic sense.

We shudder at the thought of more than a million people gathered on one long street demanding the end to a despotic regime, and when we recall how they achieved their purpose without resistance from the government’s army, we shudder even more.

Twenty-six years have passed, yet we have not recovered from the euphoria of EDSA I. Every year we celebrate its anniversary, even much bigger than our Independence Day parade. To many Filipinos, EDSA I was the real thing.

Filipino People Power. Photo courtesy of manilamommy. Click link to view
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YL0lM3abUQE&feature=fvst, "26th EDSA
People Power Anniversary Rally."

Never again, we tell ourselves, shall we allow one dictator to rule over us. As if this were the magic bullet that we need every time we face a crisis. Just gather about 2 million people and get them to march on the street. Let their voices be heard, that would be enough. That’s the miracle of EDSA I.

Why did we become so enslaved to this romantic notion that EDSA I and all its derivatives of display of people power would be enough, that it is the end-all to our problems?

Was EDSA I a revolution?

EDSA I was a popular protest of close too to 2 million Filipinos against authoritarianism, against almost 20 years of despotic rule, of wanton corruption, of abuse of power, of crony capitalism. Although the protest was staged only in Manila, it was considered a collective entreaty by the nation to the dictator to step down and let a new government take over. A new president was elected, and the people vowed not to tolerate any more cheating and fraud. It was a united plea for change. But even that idea of change was so vague and nebulous.

EDSA I represented a cleansing of the heavy cheating and fraud during the presidential elections held in 1986. It was the penultimate event to the declaration of the genuine winner, Mrs. Cory Aquino, who was catapulted to the role of a reluctant national leader after her husband Ninoy was assassinated. Cory Aquino was immediately embraced as the symbolic leader of a peaceful transition to genuine democratic reforms. But even the idea of democratic reform was alien to Cory Aquino’s state of mind, so she left everything to her advisers to chart the map towards building a new government that is supposed to be responsive to the people.

EDSA I meant the restoration of the old oligarchy that was removed and transplanted by Ferdinand Marcos with his own political cronies. It meant that Cory Aquino’s family would recover their old economic foothold, in the same way as it did for the oligarchs of the past.

EDSA I changed the leadership structure of government, but not the structure of society. The poor remain stuck in the quagmire of poverty. The new leaders and the new politicians are all members of family dynasties bred by the oligarchs. It was a replication of the old Marcos government, except that the people who ran the government are now allies of the restored oligarchy. Where did the poor and downtrodden masses figure in the new government after EDSA I? They became significant only during elections, when it was time to buy their votes. Their disenchantment toward their government continues to the present.

EDSA I was the culmination of the people’s revolt against 20 years of Marcos dictatorship. It didn’t happen just because Marcos cheated Cory Aquino during the snap presidential elections in 1986. It didn’t happen because the people were angry at Ferdinand Marcos for the assassination of Ninoy Aquino three years earlier. It happened because the timing was right. Marcos was frail and already dying. The disgruntled elements of the military seized that opportunity to rally their members who had long been dissatisfied with the military establishment, the Roman Catholic Church and its multitude of followers, and the disaffected business sector to come out to the streets and join the popular protest. Members of the leftist movement who were the most militant and who bore the brunt of repression of all groups in opposing the Marcos rule during the 20-year period, had no choice but to join the wave of protesters as well. EDSA I happened because the United States government supported the idea of disposing Marcos and replacing him with a new one.

EDSA I elevated the military to a hero’s status. After being sworn to office, instead of prosecuting those in the military for violation of human rights and the basic legal right to express a contrary opinion and for being responsible for the many who were extra-judicially killed and disappeared, Cory Aquino pardoned the perpetrators. No effort was made to establish the truth and seek reconciliation as other countries under similar circumstances had done after their political upheaval was over.

To the media and moderate Filipino intellectuals, EDSA I was a revolution. They were responsible in propagating this myth that people power had effectively spoken and that EDSA I was instrumental in restoring democracy in the Philippines. True, the dictator was deposed and forced to exile in Hawaii. But democratic institutions like popular elections, the free press, Congress and the judiciary were all in existence, albeit subject to the whims and caprices of the strongman Marcos.

Military as shadow government

Nothing very dramatic or revolutionary happened after EDSA I. It simply installed a new leader, someone who did not meet the basic requisites of a national leader but symbolic enough to lead the country from dictatorship. This is the singular achievement of EDSA I, the proclamation of Cory Aquino and the ouster of Ferdinand Marcos, the passing of the baton from a dictator to someone more moderate and compassionate.

Cory Aquino’s lack of political experience was tested early by malcontents in the military. Staging a series of coups against the government, the military kept reminding the new president that they were a crucial and integral force in the new balance of power. So Cory had to assuage a more serious military opposition to her administration. The military had become the shadow government, and the eternal threat to succeeding presidents like Ramos, Estrada, Arroyo and now, Noynoy Aquino, the son who also rises.

Restoring the old oligarchy which Marcos destroyed was also a priority for Mrs. Aquino, who herself hailed from a landed class with a vast array of economic and financial interests that were held back by the old Marcos regime. Together with the old oligarchy, the new power-holders cemented their firm grasp of political power. To those with the economic means and resources goes the concentration of political power. They bred and continue to multiply political dynasties who control different positions in national and local governments. Politicians and their relatives have controlled political power since the time of Marcos, and Cory Aquino made sure this arrangement would remain. An emerging breed of politicians such as movie, TV and sports celebrities was encouraged to relieve the growing discontent of the masses so these favourite celluloid heroes were added into the mix.

Same same

This was the very same oligarchy that the American colonial period ushered in from the landed elites in the 19th century. The development of these families as the new oligarchy was important to the American colonisers, and these families were able to dominate the country’s political and administrative apparatus and shape it to serve their own ends.

So EDSA I ensured the continuation of an oligarchy that would always remain in control of the levers of the economy and the powers of government. What revolution are the media and moderate darlings of the Philippine intelligentsia talking about?

A revolution is always followed by fundamental changes in socio-political institutions after the struggle for state power. A revolution does not have to be violent. It could be extra-constitutional and in the form of a popular but peaceful upheaval like the Dandi Salt March led by the pioneer of nonviolent resistance Mahatma Gandhi in 1930. EDSA I did not alter the socio-political landscape after Marcos was deposed. In fact, EDSA I reinforced the oligarchy and its control of the economy and politics of the country.

If the exercise of people power is to be considered relevant, then we should expect some profound changes after all the public fuss is over. We should wait for something more drastic than a mere change in leaders, like prosperity for all, for example.

With Filipino people power as in the case of EDSA I, you could almost expect everyone to join with or without a cause. To be meaningful, a real mass movement must have an unmistakable expression of resentment and desperation. That’s why the call for a new people power or revival of EDSA I to oust Corona as Chief Justice will easily fall on deaf ears, except for the few who are the clear beneficiaries of such public uproar.

The Filipino masses are in a desperate condition all right, but unfortunately there is no sign that they feel the slightest resentment against the Chief Justice. Probably, they would just sit this one at home and blame the President for his penchant for playing political games.

Eventually, however, change of some sort must be made. Not through another EDSA I or a similar expression of people power. That won’t cut. New forms of structure need to be set up, and old forms must be destroyed. This is the critical moment which is properly called revolution.

The never-ending saga of Hacienda Luisita

During the tumult of 1984, Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino Jr.’s widow, Corazon Cojuangco-Aquino, rose to the occasion and emerged as the anointed leader of a peaceful revolution that would topple the despotic Marcos regime. Ferdinand Marcos, the country’s dictator for almost twenty years, fled to Hawaii after his downfall where he eventually died in exile. Cory Aquino became the reluctant president who would restore the democratic institutions which were destroyed by the strongman Marcos.

Twenty-eight years later to 2012, Cory Aquino’s son, now President Benigno “Noynoy” Aquino III is dangerously pushing the country to the cusp of yet another upheaval. But this time, there would be no deliverance from an oppressive regime where his mother Cory was the symbolic leader of the first EDSA People Power Revolution. Instead, Noynoy Aquino could be the one to blame for starting an agrarian revolt right in his own family’s backyard, an uprising that could virtually spread throughout the country.

An unclassified but sensitive US diplomatic cable published by anti-secrecy group Wikileaks has said that the implications of the Hacienda Luisita case to the landholdings of other wealthy families in the Philippines who have avoided land reform would be far ranging and would have a deep social impact.

Peasant revolution under Noynoy Aquino? Photo courtesy of Michael Wailes.

After the Supreme Court made its decision last November 22, 2011, to redistribute the lands of Hacienda Luisita to its farm workers in accordance with the terms and conditions of the loan that enabled the Cojuangco family to purchase the Hacienda in 1957, Noynoy Aquino’s spokesperson assured that there was no reason why Hacienda Luisita would not comply with the court’s ruling if it became final and executory. On December 12, 2011, the management of Hacienda Luisita filed a motion for reconsideration before the Supreme Court appealing its decision ordering the distribution of Hacienda Luisita to its farm workers, yet ensuring another chapter in the enduring saga of Hacienda Luisita and the continuing doggedness of the Cojuangco family to hold on to their last vestige of feudal possession.

Through various legal manoeuvres, Hacienda Luisita has avoided compliance with the original condition of their loan in 1957 to transfer ownership to the farmers 10 years after the loan matured in 1967. When Cory Aquino assumed the presidency in 1986, she exempted Hacienda Luisita from the government’s land reform program she herself initiated. Three more presidents came to power but Hacienda Luisita remained in the hands of the Cojuangco family, which includes the late president Cory Aquino and her son, the current president.

In July 2011, after a series of motions for reconsideration, including a restraining order to stay the Supreme Court’s decision scrapping the stock distribution option (SDO) proposed by the management of Hacienda Luisita, the Supreme Court revoked the SDO but allowed individual farmers to choose between owning the land or remaining as a stockholder of the Hacienda. The government appealed the Court’s ruling and asked the high court for the full distribution of the land to the farmer beneficiaries, which would lead to the November 22nd ruling in favour of the farmers.

Hacienda Luisita farmers' misery and the SDO. Photo courtesy of Jes Aznar/Bulatlat.
Click link http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ebetyUHC9hE to view "Sa Ngalan ng
Tubo: A Documentary on Hacienda Luisita, Parts 1-4."

It would now appear that the Supreme Court decision to redistribute the lands would never be final and executory. The new motion for reconsideration by the management of Hacienda Luisita has reassured that the issue would never die unless the Supreme Court decision is reversed or Supreme Court Chief Justice Corona is impeached, whichever comes first.

On close examination, the Supreme Court decision of November 22nd is in itself flawed and self-defeating. In ruling that the Hacienda lands be distributed to its farm workers, the high court also ordered that owners of the Hacienda be paid just compensation to be calculated from November 21, 1989, the date the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) revoked the stock distribution plan of Hacienda Luisita. The Department of Agrarian Reform and the Land Bank of the Philippines were ordered to determine the compensation due to Hacienda Luisita management.

At issue before the Supreme Court then was who had control over agricultural lands if the stock distribution plan of Hacienda Luisita were to be operational. The court found that the farmers would never gain control of the lands if they remained as stockholders because the management of Hacienda Luisita would always have the greater proportion of shareholdings. Thus, to place control in the hands of the farmers, the lands should be distributed to the farmers instead of allowing them to remain as stockholders in a minority position.

Having said that, the issue of ownership and control over the lands has been settled in favour of the farmers. Why then should Hacienda Luisita management be compensated? They have never been the rightful and legal owners of the lands. The fact is the management of Hacienda Luisita has benefited from these lands since 1957 and from the sale and conversion of some of the lands which they never owned. It is therefore ludicrous to order the farmers who are now the legitimate owners of the lands to pay the management of Hacienda Luisita. The Cojuangco family never owned the lands in the first place, and if they were, their ownership would be limited to 10 years from the time they obtained the lands in 1957 through a government loan. In failing to transfer the lands to the farmers in 1967 and continuing to benefit from the use of the lands up to the present time, the Cojuangcos have no legal and moral obligation to demand compensation. By right, the farmers should be asking for recompense from the Cojuangcos instead.

The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) is trying to implement compensation for Hacienda Luisita under the land reform law which arguably does not cover the lands of the Hacienda. Even if Hacienda Luisita should now be embraced by the comprehensive agrarian reform law, the DAR should take into account that the Cojuangcos have been well compensated over the years for the use of lands they never owned.

Hacienda Luisita implemented its stock distribution option when Cory Aquino was president and as a way of evading land distribution under comprehensive land reform law. When PARC revoked the SDO, the Cojuangco-Aquino family went to the Supreme Court and filed a petition for a temporary restraining order. This temporary order lasted for six years until the Supreme Court’s decision of November 22.

The DAR is relying on a lame and absurd policy that it does not distribute lands for free, that beneficiaries ought to pay. Ownership of the lands has now been settled. Hacienda Luisita is simply being transferred to its rightful owners, not under land reform but under the original condition of the loan that enabled the Cojuangcos to use the lands for ten years and more because of the family’s political influence and economic clout.

Now that the DAR and the farmers are at odds on the issue of compensation, this would probably put the burden on the Supreme Court again to reconsider its decision or clarify the matter of compensation. Either way, the case enters a stage of limbo where it may not be settled beyond the years remaining in the Aquino presidency just as the restraining order took a toll of six long years, despite being temporary in nature.

Or the justices of the Supreme Court, being chastened by the ongoing impeachment proceeding before the Senate and fearful of their own job security, may decide to reverse their decision. Naturally, the farmers will request the high court to reconsider. If they win again, then its Hacienda Luisita’s turn to ask for reconsideration. So it goes on and on. It has become an endless and ridiculous cycle where no acceptable solution seems possible. All along the general idea is that the Supreme Court has the last and final say on the matter. But simply not in the case of Hacienda Luisita where a sitting president and a powerfully entrenched political family are involved in threatening to destroy the entire judicial system.

Or, the farmers might take the matter into their own hands, which is not highly improbable because the government’s comprehensive land reform program has become an abject failure. With recent events unfolding, there seems to be no other viable alternative.